Plaintiffs have outmaneuvered the legal system. They’ve discovered the nexus of antiquated copyright laws, paralyzing social stigma, and unaffordable defense costs. And they exploit this anomaly by accusing individuals of illegally downloading a single pornographic video. Then they offer to settle—for a sum calculated to be just below the cost of a bare-bones [legal] defense. For these individuals, resistance is futile; most reluctantly pay rather than have their names associated with illegally downloading porn. So now, copyright laws originally designed to compensate starving artists allow, starving attorneys in this electronic-media era to plunder the citizenry.

Unfortunately, this is not news to a lot of us. But what makes it newsworthy—even to those of us who've known about it all along—is that the man behind the curtain, the Phantom of the Opera, the [insert masqued villain of your choice] has finally been revealed, and in dramatic fashion. But what did they do that was so bad? The short answer is this: Attorneys John Steele, Paul Hansmeier, Angela Van Den Hemel, and Paul Duffy developed a business plan that centered on them planting pornographic movies in places where they were likely to be downloaded using peer-to-peer file sharing protocol. Then they monitored those servers for download activity, and filed suit against the IP addresses associated with the "illegal" downloading. Since attorneys can't really file suit on their own behalves, they created several fake people to stand in the place of the plaintiffs, by stealing the identities of various individuals, one of whom just happened to be John Steele's gardener. 

Okay, so that wasn't exactly short, let me summarize my summary: Prenda Law Inc. used our federal courts to more or less blackmail or extort money out of defendants who were essentially hauled into court only because of situations that the plaintiffs themselves created. I liken it to a civil version of entrapment. Judge Wright likened it to racketeering.

In total, the judge only ordered Prenda Law to pay a little over $80,000 in sanctions, but that's not the significance of the order, or the case. Judge Wright has asked that a copy of the order be forwarded to every court in which Prenda Law or one of its affiliates has a case pending. Further, Judge Wright has asked that a copy of the order be forwarded to attorney disciplinary body of each state in which the Prenda Law attorneys are admitted to practice. That could potentially bring an end to the entire porno-trolling litigation industry.

I've been writing about this seemingly epic story since Ravi was indicted not because it's directly related to my sports or entertainment law practice, but because of how close the case is to my everday life—I have two degrees from Rutgers University, and all of the events unfolded within a few miles of where I live and work, not to mention that the trial took place one block from my office. In addition, the underlying issues in the case are of national importance because of their likely effect on constitutional law, criminal procedure, and the law as it pertains to social media; moreover, the principal crime with which Dharun was charged—invasion of privacy—is a typical scenario not only in my own law practice, but for all entertainment lawyers.

So why am I writing about it again? Because the state of New Jersey (i.e. prosecutor's office) is appealing the alleged leniency of Dharun's sentence. After the jury convicted Dharun of the majority of the charges, the prosecutor asked the court to sentence him to 5–7 years in prison (remember, the maximum sentence was 10 years) (read the state's sentencing memo here). But Judge Glenn Berman sentenced Dharun to just 30 days in county lockup, of which he only had to serve 20 days. Dharun's attorneys are also appealing, but they are appealing the entire conviction, based among other things, on the prosecutor's failure to disclose key defense evidence.

I've written about the appellate process a few times (see here & here) not only because it's something with which I have a lot of experience, but also, it's one of the most misunderstood aspects of our judicial process. This case presents a unique situation within the appellate process—the state's right to appeal. Typically, the state only appeals criminal cases when the judge throws out key evidence, which results in dismissal of the charges. Prosecutors can't appeal acquittals because of the Double Jeopardy Clause. With regard to sentencing, defendants routinely appeal their sentences as being too harsh, but prosecutors rarely (almost never) appeal sentences for being too lenient, the reason being that appellate courts don't usually overturn sentences, for either side. (NB: a recent exception.) This has to do with the appellate court's limited scope of review. For what it's worth, the scope of review in New Jersey is consistent with the federal standard, and the standards held by most states, as restated recently in State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283 (2010).  

Sentenc[ing] is among the most solemn and serious responsibilities of a trial court. No word formula will ever eliminate this requirement that justice be done...In exercising its authority to impose sentence, the trial court must identify and weigh all of the relevant aggravating factors that bear upon the appropriate sentence as well as those mitigating factors that are fully supported by the evidence. Although there is more discretion involved in identifying mitigating factors than in addressing aggravating factors, those mitigating factors that are suggested in the record, or are called to the court's attention, ordinarily should be considered and either embraced or rejected on the record.

Appellate review of sentencing decisions is relatively narrow and is governed by an abuse of discretion standard. In conducting the review of any sentence, appellate courts always consider whether the trial court has made findings of fact that are grounded in competent, reasonably credible evidence and whether the factfinder has applied correct legal principles in exercising its discretion.

What that means is that in every sentencing order, the judge must give a carefully reasoned analysis of the circumstances of the case, which he or she considered and relied upon in arriving at the sentence ordered. In Dharun's case, Judge Glenn Berman couldn't have been any clearer as to how and why he sentenced him to just 30 days (video clip includes sentencing hearing). Based on the thoroughness and lucidity of the judge's analysis, it seems highly unlikely that the Appellate Division would overturn Dharun's sentence. Anybody who says differently is either making noise, or just bitter.

Add to the equation the fact that Dharun has, now, already served his time, so sending him back to prison would essentially be like punishing him again for the same crime. Although I'm not aware of the Double Jeopardy Clause being asserted in the context of appeals of sentencing orders, I believe it could be used to Dharun's benefit in this case. Dharun had the option of waiting until his own appeal was decided before serving his term of incarceration, but he chose not to wait, and to get it over with now. Dharun said he wanted to go to jail so he could close this chapter in his life, but I wonder if he had help in arriving at his decision to turn himself in early. Given the dire consequences of the Appellate Division overturning Dharun's sentence—no matter how remote of that possibility—did Steven Altman and the rest of Dharun's legal team take the calculated risk of sending their client to jail so they could pull the rug out from under the prosecution's feet?

For everyone who says that juries aren't giving out mega-verdicts anymore, here's your exception: Last week, a federal jury in Philadelphia gave a $5,000,000 early X'mas present to a couple law professors in a defamation suit.† (Jury's Verdict pdf file).

Outside of legal contexts, the term defamation gets thrown around a lot, and although many people know what it is, most non-lawyers do not know what it takes to win a defamation lawsuit. In reality, defamation suits aren't very common, because they are in fact difficult to win. Why? Because the plaintiff must prove all of these elements:

(1) the defendant made a false & defamatory statement (if the statement was printed it is libel, an oral statement would be slander);

(2) to a third party;

(3) knowledge that the statement was false (or in some cases, merely negligence about the statement's truthfulness); and

(4) damages, or special harm that was caused by the statement.‡

Since 1987, the two professors, David Rudovsky (Penn. Law) and Leonard Sosnov (Widener) were the authors of the treatise Pennsylvania Criminal Procedure: Law, Commentary & Forms, published by West, but after they got into a dispute with West over royalties and compensation, they withdrew from the project. See Complaint (pdf file). But after the authors withdrew, West went ahead and published an update (aka "pocket part") which is supposed to contain important changes and updates to the laws that are the book's subject matter. Also, West continued to list Rudovsky and Sosnov as the authors. The problem was (in addition to using the authors' names without their consent) that the update West published omitted material changes in the law, and basically made the purported authors look like imbeciles.

The authors sued the legal publishing giant for (1) false advertising, under the Lanham Act; (2) unauthorized use of name, under Pa. state law; and common law claims for (3) defamation; (4) invasion of privacy/appropriation of name; and (5) false light. The trial court ultimately dismissed the first 2 claims, but the jury rendered a verdict in the authors' favor on the defamation and invasion of privacy claims. It seems likely, however, given the enormous resources of West Publishing and its parent company is Thomson Reuters this case is probably headed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, where West will argue that the punitive damages award is grossly disproportionate to the compensatory damages.

†Credit: Erika Wayne, of The Legal Intelligencer first reported this story in her blog, which has additional case history and details.

‡ See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Law of Defamation, Privacy, Publicity, & Moral Right: Cases and Materials on Protection of Personality Interests 4th ed., 6 (JPM Books 2000).